Abstract -This paper provides a novel method for identifying informed institutional trading by conditioning on investors' tastes. Given an information signal about a stock, an investor's tastes for certain characteristics of that stock can influence his decision to trade. Thus, trades which deviate from an investor's tastes are more likely to reflect information. I test this hypothesis with respect to institutional investors' taste for An analysis of institutions' sin stock holdings provides complementary evidence using another dimension of investor tastes, supporting the hypothesis that trades which deviate from an investor's tastes are more likely to reflect information.
Introduction
Whether institutional investors are better informed or have investment skill is an important and enduring question in finance. A long line of research from Jensen (1968) to Fama and French (2010) finds that actively managed mutual funds underperform passive benchmarks after fees, while a number of other studies suggest that a subset of mutual funds appear to possess superior skill or information. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find a positive relation between institutional ownership and stock returns, but attribute this to demand pressure rather than informational advantage. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) , Cai and Zheng (2004) , and Yan and Zhang (2009) find conflicting results on whether institutional trading predicts future stock returns.
In this paper, I argue that heterogeneity in investor tastes can provide a useful way of identifying informed trades. The impact of investor tastes on portfolio choice and assets prices has been a topic of considerable recent interest. Investor tastes for a variety of asset characteristics have received attention in both the theoretical and empirical literature, including preferences for return skewness, preferences for firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility, aversion to "sin stocks" such as alcohol, tobacco and gambling companies, and stock preferences based on political values. 1 While these studies primarily focus on portfolio allocations and their aggregate impact on stock prices, I conjecture that investors' tastes can influence their response to private information, so that conditioning on investor tastes can identify trades which are likely to be informed.
The main idea is simple: when an investor obtains noisy private information about a security, the investor's taste for certain characteristics of that security (beyond the mean and variance of its return) can influence his or her threshold for trading on that information. For example, suppose that an investor avoids holding the stock of company A because she opposes the firm's environmental practices. The investor then obtains information indicating that company A's stock will appreciate over the next period. Because her tastes impose an additional cost to investing in Company A's stock, she may require a stronger information signal to induce her to buy. Empirically, then, if one observes an investor with strong preferences for environmental responsibility loading up on company A's stock, that trade is more likely to reflect information. More generally, trades which deviate from an investor's tastes are more likely motivated by superior information.
In this paper I focus specifically on investors' preference for skewness. Skewness preferences have drawn considerable attention from finance academics dating back to Markowitz (1952) , and recent literature has documented the impact of skewness or gambling preferences on portfolio choice and expected returns. 2 The key hypothesis is that investors who are relatively averse to holding stocks with high skewness will earn higher abnormal returns on those that they do choose to hold. This prediction follows naturally from two assumptions: (1) the investors have access to potentially profitable information on certain stocks, and (2) the investors have tastes for skewness which impose additional costs (or benefits, depending on the investor's particular taste and the skewness of the stock) of holding those stocks. Thus, an informed investor who is averse to skewness would require a stronger information signal on a highly skewed stock in order to offset her distaste for the stock's skewness. As a result, her ex post stock positions among highly skewed stocks would have higher expected returns. I test this hypothesis by examining the returns to institutional investors' stock holdings, condithe effect of green investment, and Fama and French (2007) propose a general framework for introducing tastes into a CAPM setting. Empirical studies of the price impact of investor tastes include Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) , Mitton and Vorkink (2007) , Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) , Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) , Hong and Kostovetsky (2010) , and Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2010) .
2 See Mitton and Vorkink (2007) , Barberis and Huang (2008) , Kumar (2009) , Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) , and Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2010) for recent work on investor tastes for return skewness.
tional on the stock's expected skewness and on the institution's preference for skewness. I focus on institutional portfolio managers as a class of potentially informed investors that constitute a large portion of equity ownership and trading volume. In the main analysis, I measure an institution's taste for positive skewness by observing its average portfolio allocation to stocks in the highest quintile of expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW) over the prior four quarters. Sorting institutions by their observed preference for highly skewed stocks, and sorting stocks by their expected skewness, I form portfolios of the stocks in each quintile of EISKEW held by institutions in each quintile of skewness preference.
Consistent with the main hypothesis, I find that the portfolio of high EISKEW stocks held by the most skewness-averse institutions earns an average abnormal return of 207 basis points per quarter (t-stat 1.84), which is economically large and substantially larger than the returns to stocks with lower expected skewness or those held by more skewness-tolerant institutions. Assuming that information obtained by institutions is relatively short-lived, it may be more informative to examine the returns to stocks recently purchased by institutions, since their holdings may include stock positions that are stale. Thus, I further examine the returns to portfolios consisting of institutions' "fresh" holdings, defined following Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2009) as those stocks in which the institution increased its portfolio weight over the previous quarter. The fresh holdings of high EISKEW stocks by the most skewness-averse institutions earn an average abnormal return of 273 basis points per quarter (t-stat 2.39), and the difference in abnormal returns between high EISKEW stocks held by skewness-averse institutions and those held by skewness-tolerant institutions is large and statistically significant (201 bp per quarter, t-stat 2.14). Conditioning on skewness preferences yields no discernible difference in performance among institutions' holdings of stocks with lower EISKEW.
These results strengthen when I focus on the holdings of more aggressive institution types who are more likely to be informed, and are robust to controlling for industry. The latter is important because industry is an important predictor of skewness (e.g. Zhang (2005) ) and institutions may specialize in certain industries without having a genuine preference for skewness. The results are somewhat stronger for more concentrated institutions, for larger institutions, and in the latter part of the sample period. Overall, the evidence is consistent with skewness-averse institutions requiring stronger information signals to induce them to trade stocks with high skewness.
As an alternative to measuring skewness preferences based on prior portfolio allocations, I conduct further analysis using geographic variation in religious composition to proxy for local gambling (skewness) preferences. Specifically, I use the ratio of Catholic adherents to Protestant adherents (CPRATIO) in each county of the United States. This measure is motivated by the observation that the major Protestant denominations prohibit gambling, while the Catholic church maintains a tolerant position on moderate gambling. 3 The predictive power of religious background for gambling behavior has been well established in a variety of settings, including various financial market settings (e.g. Kumar (2009), Kumar, Page, and ).
I find that CPRATIO is positively related to institutions' portfolio weight in high EISKEW stocks, and is also related to portfolio turnover, particularly among high EISKEW stocks. This suggests that CPRATIO does a reasonable job of capturing variation in institutions' preferences for holding stocks with lottery-like payoffs. Using the local CPRATIO as a proxy for skewness preferences, I find that the portfolio of high EISKEW stocks held by the most skewness-averse (low CPRATIO) institutions earns an average abnormal return of 147 basis points per quarter (t-stat 1.90). Focusing on fresh positions, the high EISKEW stocks held by the most skewness-averse institutions earn an average abnormal return of 268 basis points per quarter (t-stat 2.29). This confirms the previous findings using an entirely different proxy for institutions' tastes for stocks with high skewness. The stylized result that the stocks with high skewness held by skewness-averse investors earn high abnormal returns thus appears to be fairly robust.
In order to examine the information content of institutional trades more directly, I study returns following significant trades by skewness-averse and skewness-tolerant institutions. The return on high EISKEW stocks purchased by skewness-averse institutions is 251 basis points (t-stat 1.90).
The return differential between high EISKEW stocks purchased and those sold by skewness-averse 3 The gambling views typical of many Protestant churches are expressed in the United Methodist Church's 2004 Book of Resolutions: "Gambling is a menace to society, deadly to the best interests of moral, social, economic, and spiritual life, and destructive of good government. As an act of faith and concern, Christians should abstain from gambling and should strive to minister to those victimized by the practice." The position of the Catholic Church on gambling is summarized in the New Catholic Encyclopedia: "A person is entitled to dispose of his own property as he wills. . . so long as in doing so he does not render himself incapable of fulfilling duties incumbent upon him by reason of justice or charity. Gambling, therefore, though a luxury, is not considered sinful except when the indulgence in it is inconsistent with duty." Further, The Catechism of the Catholic Church (2413) states: "Games of chance (card games, etc.) or wagers are not in themselves contrary to justice. They become morally unacceptable when they deprive someone of what is necessary to provide for his needs and those of others. The passion for gambling risks becoming an enslavement. Unfair wagers and cheating at games constitute grave matter, unless the damage inflicted is so slight that the one who suffers it cannot reasonably consider it significant." Thompson 2001, pg. 317-324 provides a summary of the gambling views of major religious denominations in the U.S.
institutions is 257 basis points per quarter, but is weaker statistically (t-stat 1.68). Neither the buy portfolio returns nor the buy-sell return differential are significant for stocks in lower quintiles of EISKEW, and they are not significant in any quintile of EISKEW for the trade portfolios based ownership changes by the most skewness-tolerant institutions. This provides further evidence that the trades of high EISKEW stocks by the most skewness-averse institutions do reflect stronger information signals.
Finally, I analyze institutions' holdings of "sin stocks" to provide complementary evidence using another dimension of investor tastes. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) argue that social norms against funding businesses that promote vice lead institutions to avoid sin stocks-stocks of publicly traded companies that produce alcohol, tobacco, or gaming. They provide evidence that institutions generally avoid sin stocks, underweighting them in aggregate, and that sin stocks earn higher-thanexpected average returns due to their relative neglect by institutional investors. Analogous to the previous evidence with respect to skewness preferences, I find that the sin stock positions of the institutions most averse to holding them earn significantly higher returns than those held by more tolerant institutions. Among banks, insurance companies, and other institutions such as pension funds, which Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) identify as more likely subject to social norms, sin stocks held by the most averse institutions exhibit abnormal returns of 280 bp per quarter (t-stat 2.77), 258 bp higher (t-stat 2.29) than those held by the most tolerant institutions. The fresh sin stock holdings of averse institutions earn abnormal returns of 300 bp per quarter (t-stat 2.83), 357 bp higher (t-stat 2.98) then the returns to fresh holdings by tolerant institutions. Overall, the analysis of sin stock holdings corroborates the evidence from high skewness stocks.
The magnitude of the abnormal returns earned by investors who deviate from their tastes, and the difference in abnormal returns to high EISKEW or sin stock holdings conditional on investor tastes provide novel evidence that institutional investors do have access to superior information. This paper thus contributes to the large literature which seeks to measure investment skill by providing a novel way of identifying informed trades. Perhaps the closest paper in this area is Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2009) , which identifies the stock in each mutual fund portfolio that is most overweighted relative to the market or to a proxy for the fund's benchmark, and finds that these "best ideas" earn significant abnormal returns. While my paper is similar in spirit, in that it focuses on subsets of institutional stock positions that are more likely to reflect information, the use of investor tastes to identify potential informed trades is novel. Furthermore, my paper differs in that the hypothesis refers to the certain groups of stocks within an investor's portfolio rather than single stock picks, and thus may apply to larger components of the portfolio. This paper is also related to the growing literature on the role of investor tastes for portfolio choice and asset prices. Mitton and Vorkink (2007) and Barberis and Huang (2008) show, using very different frameworks, how investors' preferences for skewness can lead to even idiosyncratic skewness being priced in the cross-section. Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) model the effect of green investment on firms' cost of capital and corporate decision-making, and Fama and French (2007) propose a general framework for introducing tastes into a CAPM setting. Empirical studies of the price impact of investor tastes include Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) , who study changes over time in institutional preferences for small, volatile stocks, and the impact of those changing preferences on stock prices. Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) use estimates of expected idiosyncratic skewness to show that idiosyncratic skewness is negatively related to returns, while Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2010) show that the negative premium on stocks with high skewness and volatility varies with a measure of local demand for skewness. Similarly, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that sin stocks earn positive abnormal returns due to their neglect by institutional investors, while Hong and Kostovetsky (2010) show that fund managers' political values influence their portfolio choices.
Finally, the intuition behind the main hypothesis in this paper is related to the seminal work by Becker (1957) on the economics of discrimination. Becker argues that an employer with a taste for discrimination must be compensated for the disutility of hiring a minority employee, and thus will only hire a minority if that individual is exceptionally productive. Ex post, we should observe that minority employees are more productive than other employees. Ben-David, Glushkov, and Moussawi make a similar argument to the one in this paper to interpret their finding that hedge fund trades are most informative among stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. In contrast to their paper, I focus on cross-sectional differences across institutions in their skewness preferences, which allow me to test directly the argument that deviation from an investor's tastes is a signal of information-motivated trading.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data and sample construction. Section III analyzes the returns to institutional holdings conditional on expected skewness and institutional skewness preferences. Section IV examines the returns to sin stocks conditional on institutional tastes. Section V concludes. I also use institutional classifications from Brian Bushee to help define the sample. Because I want a relatively homogeneous sample of active institutions that are more likely to have information, I exclude passive institutions that are classified as "quasi-indexers" on the basis of their diversification and turnover. In some cases, I focus on subsamples based on institutional investor types. Because the type codes provided by Thomson Financial are not reliable after 1997, I use the type codes provided by Bushee, which maintain the 1997 code for institutions that remain in the sample, and manually assign codes for institutions that enter the sample later.
Data and

Expected Idiosyncratic Skewness
To measure the attractiveness of a stock to an investor with preferences for skewness, I estimate expected idiosyncratic skewness (EISKEW) for each stock following the approach of Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) and Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) . This consists of using firm-level variables to predict idiosyncratic skewness in the cross-section. This is important because idiosyncratic skewness itself is unstable over time (see Harvey and Siddique (2000) ) and it is ex ante skewness, rather than past realized skewness, that should drive the decisions of investors with skewness preferences. Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) document a significant negative relation between expected idiosyncratic skewness and average returns. This is consistent with at least a subset of the investor population having a taste for lottery-like payoffs characterized by positive skewness (see Mitton and Vorkink (2007) and Barberis and Huang (2008) ). The objective of this paper is to exploit variation in investors' taste of positive skewness in order to identify stock positions that are likely to reflect strong information signals. 4 The key predictors of idiosyncratic skewness include lagged skewness and idiosyncratic volatility, as well as momentum and turnover (motivated by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) and Hong and Stein (2003) ), firm size, and industry. I compute idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the residuals from a four-factor regressions including the three Fama and French (1993) factors plus the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, estimated using daily returns over the prior 6 months.
Similarly, I compute idiosyncratic skewness as
where S(t) is the set of trading days in the previous six months, N (t) is the number of trading days in S(t), ε 3 i,d is the residual on day d from the four-factor regression estimated over S(t), and idiovol i,t is the idiosyncratic volatility of stock i as defined above. To estimate expected idiosyncratic skewness, I first estimate separate cross-section regressions at the end of each month t:
where T = 6 months and X i,t−T is a vector of firm-specific variables observed at the end of month t − T . These include:
• mom i,t−T , defined as the cumulative return of stock i over months t − T − 12 to t − T − 1
• turn i,t−T , defined as the average daily share turnover of the firm during months t − T − 2 through t − T
• dummy variables for small and medium-sized firms, from a grouping of firms into three equalsized bins based on market capitalization
• industry dummies based on the Fama and French (1997) 
Measures of Skewness Preferences
Although a typical institution is likely to avoid high EISKEW stocks due to prudent man rules and other institutional constraints (e.g., DelGuercio (1996)), some institutions might gravitate toward these stocks because they provide "cheap bets" and offer good opportunities for exploiting information asymmetry. In particular, the institutional attraction for smaller, lottery-type stocks might increase over time as competition in other market segments increases (e.g., Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) . The identification of stock positions that are likely to reflect stronger information signals depends on cross-sectional variation in institutions' tastes for skewness. I employ two distinct proxies to capture institutional preferences for positive skewness, described below.
Past Weight in High EISKEW Stocks
In the main analysis in this paper, I measure an institution's taste for positive skewness using its historical allocation of portfolio weight to stocks with high expected skewness, where high EISKEW stocks are defined as those in the highest quintile of EISKEW. Specifically, I compute the average portfolio weight in high EISKEW stocks over the previous four quarters. In most of the analysis, I
sort institutions into five equal-sized bins based on their past weight in high EISKEW stocks. For the few quarters in which more than twenty percent of firms allocated zero weight to high EISKEW stocks over the prior four quarters, I assign all institutions with zero past weight in high EISKEW stocks into the lowest bin and divide the remaining institutions into four equal sized groups assigned to bins 2-5.
Catholic-to-Protestant Ratio
In addition to the more direct measure of skewness preferences based on observed prior portfolio allocations, I also employ an alternative proxy for institutions' taste for stocks with lottery-like payoffs. Motivated by the evidence in Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2010) , I proxy for local gambling attitudes using county-level geographical variation in religious composition across the U.S. This measure is motivated by the observation that the major Protestant denominations prohibit gambling, while the Catholic church maintains a tolerant position on moderate gambling. Religious background is well-established as a key predictor of gambling behavior in the empirical gambling literature (see, for example, Berry and Berry (1990) , Martin and Yandle (1990) , Ellison and Nybroten (1999) , Diaz (2000) , and Hoffman (2000)). Furthermore, recent studies in the finance literature (e.g. Kumar (2009), Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2008) ) have documented that religion-induced gambling attitudes carry over into financial decisions. 5 In particular, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2010) 5 Golec and Tamarkin (1998) use horse track betting data to show that gamblers crave skewness, not risk. Based on their insight, it has been common in the finance literature to equate gambling preferences with a preference for skewness. See for example Mitton and Vorkink (2007) , Barberis and Huang (2008) , Kumar (2009) , Hwang (2009), Schneider and , and . The specific measure I use is the ratio of Catholics to Protestants 6 (CPRATIO) in the county where the institution is located. 7 Using this measure as a proxy for gambling preferences assumes that the gambling attitudes of the prevailing local religious group give rise to social norms that influence the behavior of individuals in the area, including institutional managers and their local clients. Table 5 . presents summary statistics of the institutional investor portfolios in the sample. The sample includes 81,003 institution-quarter observations for 5,117 unique institutions. The typical institution holds $317M in portfolio assets and holds about 1% (mean 2.7%) of its portfolio in stocks which are in the highest quintile of the EISKEW.
Summary Statistics
Portfolio turnover is defined following Yan and Zhang (2009) as
where
and where P i,t is the share price for stock i at the end of quarter t, and S k,i,t is the number of shares of stock i held by investor k at the end of quarter t. I adjust prices and shares for the effects of splits and stock dividends using the CRSP price and share adjustment factors. The average fund turns over 7.93% of its portfolio per quarter (median 6.26%), and there is substantial variation in turnover across institutions.
Portfolio concentration is a measured Herfindahl index (the sum of squared portfolio weights), while industry concentration is the sum of squared deviation of portfolio weights from the market weights of 10 industries as defined in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) . Both measures are expressed in %.
Skewness Preferences and Portfolio Performance
3.1 Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Past Weight in High EISKEW Stocks Table 5 . presents the means of various portfolio measures for institutions sorted by their past portfolio allocation to high EISKEW stocks. The portfolio measures are averaged cross-sectionally in each quarter, and the table displays the time-series averages of the cross-sectional means (or median, the case of the median portfolio size). High EISKEW weight is the current portfolio weight in stocks that are in the top quintile of EISKEW. The average high EISKEW weight increases monotonically from 0.88% for the most skewness-averse institutions in the lowest quintile to 6.14% for the most skewness-tolerant institutions (those in the highest quintile). Institutions in the extreme quintiles of prior high EISKEW weight tend to be smaller and have more concentrated portfolios.
Portfolio turnover is lower for the most skewness-averse institutions, both overall and among high EISKEW stocks in particular. This is consistent with the hypothesis that institutions that are relatively averse to skewness are more reluctant to trade high EISKEW stocks, and therefore would require a stronger information signal in order to trade.
Returns to Stock Holdings Conditional on Institutional Tastes
If skewness-averse institutions indeed have access to superior information but require a stronger information signal to induce them to trade high EISKEW stocks, then we should observe that the high EISKEW stocks they do hold earn higher abnormal returns. This is the main hypothesis of the paper, and I test it by examining the returns to institutional stock holdings conditional on EISKEW and the skewness preferences of the institution. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , where the return of each stock is in excess of the return of a portfolio of stocks with comparable size, book-to-market, and past returns.
The returns of each institution's holdings are weighted by the institutions portfolio weight, and the portfolio returns in each quintile of institutional skewness preferences are value-weighted by total value of the institutions holdings. Thus, the returns reported represent the return on the aggregate portfolio of stocks held by institutions in each quintile of past skewness preference.
Main Results
The key hypothesis is that high EISKEW stocks held by the most skewness-averse institutions should earn high abnormal returns. Panel A reports the quarterly returns to portfolios of stocks held by active institutions, where the set of active institutions is defined by excluding those institutions which are classified as "quasi-indexers" according to the Bushee and Noe (2000) classification scheme. The portfolio of high EISKEW stocks held by the most skewness-averse institutions earns an average abnormal return of 207 basis points per quarter (t-stat 1.84), which is economically large and substantially larger than that earned by stocks in any other cell. The difference in average returns between high EISKEW stocks held by skewness-averse institutions and those held by skewness-tolerant institutions is large (126 bp per quarter), but not statistically significant.
It is also interesting to note that the abnormal returns to stocks held by institu institutions is large and statistically significant (201 bp per quarter, t-stat 2.14). Conditioning on skewness preferences yields no discernible difference in performance among institutions' holdings of stocks with lower EISKEW. The result is consistent with skewness-averse institutions requiring stronger information signals to induce them to trade stocks with high skewness.
Aggressive Institutions
Panel B of Table 5 . repeats the analysis focusing on investment companies, individual investment advisors, and other institutions (types 3, 4, and 5 in the Thompson Financial database), which previous research has shown to be more aggressive, and more likely to be informed (e.g. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) , Lewellen (2009) That the results hold using industry-adjusted EISKEW suggests that they reflect genuine preferences for skewness, and not simply industry specialization. Table 5 . repeats the analysis in Table 5 . for various subsets of the institutional sample defined by key institutional characteristics. For brevity, I only report the returns using fresh positions, and only for stocks in the lowest and highest quintiles of EISKEW.
Subsample Results
Panel A reports subsamples based on institution size, splitting the sample at the median portfolio size in each time period. The returns to institutional holdings in the two subsamples suggests that the results are driven primarily by larger institutions. This may be due to the fact that larger institutions are more likely to face restrictions as in DelGuercio (1996) that limit their investments in the types of stock with high expected idiosyncratic skewness. Thus, there may be both greater variation in skewness preferences and higher hurdles for those institutions that face such limits in order to act on information regarding information signals. That the results are strongest among larger institutions may also be consistent with larger institutions having greater resources for information acquisition, as well as broader investment scopes that could result in managers obtaining information regarding stocks that fall beyond the purview of their preferences or investment mandate. Since the prediction that the high EISKEW stock holdings of skewness averse investors earn higher abnormal returns depends on investors having information or skill, this is also consistent with the model of Berk and Green (2004) in which the most skilled managers ultimately attract the largest portfolios.
Panel B reports portfolio returns for subsamples based on portfolio concentration, again splitting the sample at the median value portfolio concentration in each time period, as measured by a
Herfindahl index of portfolio weights. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) , Ivkovic, Sialm, and
Weisbenner (2008), Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2010) ), Korniotis and Kumar (2010) and others have shown that portfolio concentration is associated with superior information or investment skill. Since the hypothesis in this paper depends upon investors having access to information, the results should be stronger among investors that are more likely to be informed.
As Panel B indicates, the abnormal performance of high skewness stocks held by skewness-averse investors is somewhat stronger among institutions with more concentrated portfolios, although the result is evident in both subsamples.
Finally, Panel C reports subperiod results for the 1980-1994 and the 1995-2008 sample periods.
The subperiod returns suggest that the results are primarily driven by the latter part of the sample period. However, in the early part of the sample period, there is significant outperformance in the second-lowest quintile of skewness preferences, such as is otherwise found in the most skewnessaverse quintile. This may reflect the trend over time in institutions' willingness to hold small, volatile stocks which would have higher expected skewness, documented by Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) . There may too few observations where institutions previously held no high EISKEW stocks hold any in the current period to observe the expected result. Rather it appears that during the early period it is the institutions in the next lowest quintile of skewness preferences that are relatively averse to skewness yet willing to hold skewed stocks given a sufficiently strong information signal.
Overall, the portfolio returns in Tables 5. and 5. provide fairly robust support to the prediction that the high EISKEW stocks held by skewness-averse investors earn high abnormal returns. This is consistent with a model in which informed investors with a distaste for holding the types of stocks which exhibit skewness require stronger information signals in order to trade in stocks with high skewness. As such, it suggests that institutions do have access to superior information, but that their decision to act on that information is influenced by their preferences with respect to return skewness.
Local Religion and Portfolio Performance
A potential concern in using a measure of skewness preferences based on observed portfolio choices is that it is unclear ex ante whether an investor who overweights a certain class of stocks does out of a naive preference for that class of stocks, or because he has profitable private information about certain stocks within that class. The latter case would predict high abnormal returns for the investor who overweights that class of securities, which runs opposite the hypothesis I propose in this paper. Using lagged, rather than contemporaneous measures of an institution's portfolio allocation to high EISKEW stocks may largely mitigate this issue, though it is possible that some managers have a particular skill for identifying profitable investment opportunities among high EISKEW stocks, and thus consistently overweight high EISKEW stocks even without having a taste for skewness per se.
Since this would bias against finding evidence consistent with my original hypothesis, the results thus far suggest that such endogeneity in observed portfolio choices is unlikely to be a serious problem. Nevertheless, in this section present additional analysis using an alternate proxy for skewness preferences based on local religious composition, which is likely to be more exogenous, albeit noisier than the primary measure of skewness preferences using in the preceding analysis.
Specifically, I use the ratio of Catholics to Protestants (CPRATIO) in the county where the institution is located as a proxy for local gambling preferences, which have been equated with preferences for skewness in the finance and economics literature (e.g. Golec and Tamarkin (1998) ).
This measure is motivated by the fact that the two main religious groups in the U.S., Catholics and Protestants, have distinct positions regarding the moral acceptability of gambling. Since
Protestant denominations are generally opposed to gambling while the Catholic church considers moderate gambling acceptable, high CPRATIO areas are likely to have more tolerant attitudes toward gambling. Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2010) shows that CPRATIO predicts institutional portfolio weights in "lottery stocks" with high idiosyncratic skewness and volatility, which are the key components of expected idiosyncratic skewness. Using the same data, Shu, Sulaeman, and Yeung (2010) find that mutual funds located in more Catholic areas have more volatile returns and respond more strongly to risk-taking incentives generated by the convex flow-performance relation.
The evidence in these studies motivates the use of CPRATIO here as a proxy for institutional skewness preferences.
Characteristics of CPRATIO-Sorted Portfolios
Panel A of Table 5 . presents the means of various portfolio measures for institutions sorted by CPRATIO. The portfolio measures are averaged cross-sectionally in each quarter, and the table displays the time-series averages of the cross-sectional means (or median, the case of the median portfolio size). High EISKEW weight is the current portfolio weight in stocks that are in the top quintile of EISKEW. The average high EISKEW weight increases nearly monotonically from 1.64%
for low CPRATIO (skewness-averse) institutions in the lowest quintile to 2.56% for high CPRATIO (skewness-tolerant) institutions. Since the large financial centers tend to have higher CPRATIOs, institutional portfolios tend to be somewhat larger and more diversified in the higher quintiles of CPRATIO. Portfolio turnover is increasing in CPRATIO, both overall and among high EISKEW stocks in particular. This is consistent with the hypothesis that institutions that are relatively averse to skewness are more reluctant to trade high EISKEW stocks, and therefore would require a stronger information signal in order to trade.
Trading Behavior of High CPRATIO Institutions
To test these relationships more carefully and confirm that CPRATIO captures variation in preferences for stocks with lottery-like payoffs, Panel B reports estimates from panel regressions of high EISKEW weight and trading measures on CPRATIO and other institutional characteristics.
Since CPRATIO and institutional ownership of high skewness stocks both exhibit long-term secular trends which may be unrelated, the regressions include time effects so that identification comes from the cross-section. Furthermore, since CPRATIO is defined at the county level, the t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the county level.
The dependent variables in regression (1) is the portfolio weight in high EISKEW stocks, defined as stocks in the highest quintile of the EISKEW. CPRATIO is significantly positively related to the weight in high EISKEW stocks, consistent with CPRATIO capturing preferences for holdings stocks with lottery-like payoffs. In economic terms, going from the 25th to the 75th percentile of CPRATIO is associated with a 0.69% increase in the portfolio weight allocated to high EISKEW stocks, which is about half the interquartile range of high EISKEW weight and represents a percentage increase of approximately 25% relative to the average portfolio weight in high EISKEW stocks. Specification (2) confirms that this relationship holds when controlling for portfolio size and concentration, industry concentration, and portfolio turnover. Not surprisingly, smaller and more concentrated insitutions which trade more frequently also put more weight in high EISKEW stocks.
Specifications (3) and (4) test the prediction that investors with stronger skewness preferences will trade more, particularly among stocks with high expected skewness, because they are willing to trade high EISKEW stocks on weaker information signals than more skewness-averse investors would require. This prediction is similar in spirit to those that arise from models of overconfidence, as in Odean (1999) , which also predict excessive trading. In the overconfidence models, investors overestimate the precision of their signals, leading them to take larger positions than is warranted by the true conditional variance of the security. In this context, positive skewness offsets the deterrent effect of idiosyncratic risk for investors with a preference for skewness, leading these investors to similarly trade more among stocks with positive skewness. Because investors will behave similarly among stocks with low idiosyncratic risk and skewness, we should observe higher overall turnover, but the difference in trading volume should be especially pronounced among lottery stocks.
In regression (3), the dependent variable is overall portfolio turnover, as defined in section 2.4.
Consistent with the prediction, turnover is significantly higher for institutions in high CPRATIO areas. A change in CPRATIO from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated with a 1.1% increase in portfolio turnover, or about 10% of the interquartile range of portfolio turnover.
Furthermore, regressions (4) shows that, controlling for overall portfolio turnover, institutions in higher CPRATIO areas trade more frequently among high EISKEW stocks.
In sum, these relationships indicate that institutions in high CPRATIO areas put relatively greater weight in high EISKEW stocks, and trade them more aggressively. This suggests that CPRATIO does a reasonable job of capturing variation in institutional preferences for stocks with lottery-like payoffs, and in their willingness to trade those stocks. This confirms the previous findings using an entirely different proxy for institutions' tastes for stocks with high skewness. The stylized result that the stocks with high skewness held by skewness-averse investors earn relatively high abnormal returns thus appears to be fairly robust.
Returns to Portfolios Sorted by CPRATIO
Trade Portfolios
To provide further evidence on the information content of trades conditional on investor preferences, I examine portfolios of stocks purchased and sold by skewness-averse and skewness-tolerant institutions. Similar in spirit to focusing on fresh holdings in the previous sections, this analysis is intended to identify the information content of institutional trades more directly by studying significant purchases and sales. 
Additional Evidence: Returns to Sin Stock Holdings
The evidence thus far suggests that investors with a distaste for stocks with lottery-like returns actually earn higher abnormal returns when they do trade in high EISKEW stocks. This is consistent with informed investors requiring stronger information signals in order deviate from their tastes or preferences. To provide additional evidence on this more general hypothesis, I also examine the effects investors' (dis)taste for so-called "sin stocks." Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) argue that social norms against funding businesses that promote vice leads institutions to avoid sin stocks-stocks of publicly traded companies that produce alcohol, tobacco, or gaming. They provide evidence that institutions tend to avoid sin stocks, underweighting them in aggregate, and that sin stocks also receive less analyst coverage than comparable stocks.
Furthermore, they find that sin stocks earn higher-than-expected average returns, suggesting that the avoidance of sin stocks by a significant portion of the investing population keeps their prices depressed.
Applying my general hypothesis to the specific context of sin stocks, I predict that institutions with stronger aversion to holding sin stocks earn higher abnormal returns when they do choose to hold certain sin stocks. This arises from the argument that their aversion to holding sin stocks leads investors to require a stronger information signal before deviating from their preference to avoid those stocks. I test this hypothesis using the institutional investor holdings data.
I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) in defining sin stocks as those belonging to industry group 4 (beer or alcohol) or 5 (smoke or tobacco) using the 48 industry classification of Fama and French (1997) . Because gaming stocks are combined with hotel stocks and other entertainment firms in the Fama-French classification, gaming stocks are defined separately using NAICS classifications.
Specifically, gaming stocks are identified as those bearing NAICS codes 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, or 721120 . A stock is considered a sin stock if it falls into any of these three industry groups (alcohol, tobacco, or gaming).
The specific hypothesis is that the sin stock holdings of sin stock averse institutions will outperform those of institutions that are more tolerant of holding sin stocks. I identify institutional preferences with respect to sin stocks by looking at institutions' portfolio allocations to sin stocks in prior periods. Similar to the measure of skewness preferences described in section 2.3.1, I compute the average portfolio weight in sin stocks over the previous four quarters for each institution.
Panel A of Table 5 . reports the means and t-statistics of the quarterly DGTW-adjusted returns to sin stock holdings and non-sin stock holdings of institutions sorted by their past portfolio allocation to sin stocks. The sin stocks held by the most sin stock averse institutions exhibit a mean return of 201 basis points per quarter (t-stat 2.34). This is 92 bp higher than the returns earned by sin stocks held by the most sin stock tolerant institutions, though the difference is not statistically significant. Focusing on fresh stock positions, the results become somewhat stronger.
In particular, the difference in sin stock returns between the most averse institutions and the most tolerant increases to 141 bp per quarter (t-stat 1.92). Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that sin stocks earn a significant return premium, which they argue is due to their neglect by institutional investors subject to social norms. This sin stock Finally, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) argue that banks, insurance companies, and other institutions (types 1, 2, and 5) are more likely to be subject to the social norms against investing in firms that promote vice. They show that these institutions underweight sin stocks on average, while there is no significant underweighting on average by institution types 3 and 4, which include mutual funds and hedge funds who are more likely to be rational arbitrageurs. Conditioning on observed sin stock preferences should thus be most relevant within the set of institutions that are more likely subject to social norms. Panel C presents sin-adjusted DGTW returns to the sin stock and non-sin stock holdings of institution types 1, 2, and 5, sorted by their observed preferences for holding sin stocks. As expected, the results are considerably strong among institutions more subject to norms. Here, sin stocks held by the most averse institutions exhibit abnormal returns of 280 bp per quarter (t-stat 2.77), 258 pb higher than those held by the most tolerant institutions (t-stat 2.29). The fresh sin stock holdings of averse institutions earn abnormal returns of 300 bp per quarter (t-stat 2.83), 357 bp higher then the returns to fresh holdings by tolerant institutions (t-stat 2.98).
In contrast to the results for sin stocks, there is little difference in performance of non-sin stock holdings between sin stock averse and sin stock tolerant institutions. This suggests that the performance difference among sin stocks is driven by differences in the degree of distaste for sin stocks. Overall, the analysis of sin stock holdings corroborates the evidence from institutional holdings of high EISKEW stocks, indicating that institutions do appear to be informed, and that their production of abnormal returns through informed trading is influenced by their tastes.
Conclusion
A large body of literature docoments institutional tastes or preferences for certain stock characteristics, while an equally large body of research has found conflict results on the question of whether professional managers are informed or have investment skill. I argue that heterogeneity in investor preferences can provide a useful means of identifying stock positions or trades that are likely to reflect superior information. An investor with a distaste for a certain class of stocks would require stronger information signal to induce him to trade on that information. Thus, trades which deviate from an investor's tastes are thus likely to reflect stronger information signals.
Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that stocks with high expected skewness held the most skewness-averse institutions earn exceptionally high abnormal returns relative to those held by more skewness-tolerant institutions and to those with lower expected skewness. This is consistent with skewness-averse institutions requiring stronger information signals in order to hold high skewness stocks. The result is stronger among more aggressive institutions that are more likely to be informed, and is robust to controlling for industry. The same qualitative finding also holds using an alternative proxy for skewness preferences based on the prevailing religious beliefs in the area where the institution is located. In addition, I find corroborating evidence for the more general hypothesis by studying the returns to institutions' sin stock holdings conditional on their observed tolerance for holding sin stocks.
The magnitude of the abnormal returns earned by investors who deviate from their tastes, and the difference in abnormal returns to high EISKEW or sin stock holdings conditional on investor tastes provide novel evidence that institutional investors do have access to superior information.
This paper thus contributes to the literature which seeks to measure investment skill by providing a novel way of identifying informed trades, while also providing additional insight on the role of investor tastes for portfolio choice and asset prices. The general hypothesis likely holds in yet other settings. For example, Hong and Kostovetsky (2010) show that political values can influence the portfolio choices of mutual fund managers. When a Democrat fund manager takes a significant position in a defense industry stock, which she would normally avoid based on her political values, that trade may reflect an especially strong information signal. Investor preferences for investing in firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility may provide another interesting setting. I intend to explore such contexts as I continue this line of research.
TABLE 1 Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the main sample of institutional investor portfolios. Portfolio measures are derived from quarterly data on institutional holdings from the Thomson Financial 13(f) database, and observations are at the institution-quarter level. The sample excludes institutions that are identified as "Quasi-Indexers" according to the Bushee and Noe (2000) classification scheme. High EISKEW weight is the portfolio in stock expected idiosyncratic skewness in the top quintile, as estimated from cross-sectional predictive regressions similar to those in Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) and Hong and Stein (2003) . Assets is the total dollar value of equity holdings in the institution's portfolio. Portfolio concentration is the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights of stocks in the portfolio. Industry concentration is the sum of squared deviations of portfolio industry weights from market industry weights, as defined in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) . Turnover is dollar value of shares traded divided by the value of shares held, while high EISKEW and low EISKEW turnover are the turnover of stocks in the highest and lowest quintiles of EISKEW, respectively. CPRATIO is the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the county where the institution is located. Sin stock weight is the portfolio weight allocated to sin stocks as defined in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009 This table presents averages of various portfolio measures for institutions sorted by their average portfolio weight allocated to high EISKEW stocks over the prior four quarters. High EISKEW weight is the portfolio in stock expected idiosyncratic skewness in the top quintile, as estimated from cross-sectional predictive regressions similar to those in Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) and Hong and Stein (2003) . Assets is the total dollar value of equity holdings in the institution's portfolio. Portfolio concentration is the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights of stocks in the portfolio. Industry concentration is the sum of squared deviations of portfolio industry weights from market industry weights, as defined in Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) . Turnover is dollar value of shares traded divided by the value of shares held, while high EISKEW and low EISKEW turnover are the turnover of stocks in the highest and Panel C reports returns for subperiods (1980-1994 and 1995-2008 This table presents This table presents Sin − Non-sin −4.09 (−3.24) 
